Most housebuilders prefer greenfield plots on the edge of market towns. Berkeley Group (LSE:BKG) has spent decades doing the opposite. Around 90% of the 4,076 homes it completed in the year to 30 April 2026 were on brownfield land: old gasworks, industrial estates and tired town centres across London and the South East. These sites are costly to clean up, slow to plan and complicated to build on. Because they are so hard, few rivals compete for them, and a developer that can handle them can earn margins that ordinary land cannot.

That approach explains Berkeley's premium reputation, and also why 2026 has been difficult. Dense apartment schemes, long build times and heavy up-front spending leave it more exposed than most to weak London demand, rising tax and slow regulation. In April the company decided to stop chasing growth for now.

The question for investors is whether Berkeley's land bank and Balance Sheet can keep producing value while the Business deliberately shrinks.

How the business makes money

Berkeley (LSE:BKG) buys complex sites, often without planning permission, and adds value by securing consents, remediating the land and building large mixed-use neighbourhoods over many years. Profit comes mainly from selling private homes, many off-plan, while each scheme also delivers affordable housing and infrastructure.

A newer income stream is Berkeley Living, its build-to-rent platform. At 30 April 2026 it had 1,122 homes completed or under construction across six buildings, from Alexandra Gate in Haringey to Horlicks Quarter in Slough. Lettings and rents were meeting target, and it aims for 4,000 rental homes by the 2035 financial year.

Recent performance

Results for the year to 30 April 2026, published on 24 June, showed Revenue down 4.2% to £2,383.3 million and pre-tax profit down 14.7% to £451.4 million, in line with the roughly £450 million guidance given in December. Basic Earnings Per Share fell 10.8% to 331.6p, and the operating Margin slipped from 20.1% to 18.7%. The pre-tax Return on Equity fell from 14.9% to 12.5%.

The balance sheet held up better. Net cash rose to £363 million despite £233 million spent buying back 6.3 million shares at an average of £37.10; no dividends were paid. Net asset value per share rose 9% to 3,917p.

The warning signs were forward-looking. Underlying reservations fell around 15%, and cash due on exchanged sales dropped from £1,403 million to £1,006 million. Estimated future gross margin across 52,763 plots fell from £6.7 billion to £6.4 billion. Buyers with an immediate need still completed, but off-plan sales suffered from a lack of urgency.

The AGM trading statement on 11 September 2026, covering May to August, said the Middle East conflict and UK political uncertainty had hurt sentiment further. Enquiries were steady, but buyers without a pressing need to move stayed cautious.

Strategy and catalysts

The key moment came on 1 April 2026. Citing a worse economic outlook linked to the Middle East conflict, Berkeley rephased its Berkeley 2035 plan, cutting production by roughly 25% over four years and putting cash generation ahead of short-term profit. It now targets £1.4 billion of pre-tax profit across FY27 to FY30, spread fairly evenly. That averages about £350 million a year, well below the "similar level" to £450 million it had pointed to for FY27 only four months earlier.

The company has also largely stopped buying new land outside joint ventures, arguing that rising taxes and regulation mean new acquisitions cannot earn its required return. It plans instead to add about £2 billion of value to its existing land through re-planning. Recent consents at Borough Triangle (890 homes), Hemel Hempstead (485) and Brighton Gasworks (480), along with more than 40 amendments to existing permissions, show this at work.

Shareholder returns continue. Berkeley aims to return £640 million between October 2025 and September 2030, within a £2 billion ten-year programme, and by the end of August 2026 had bought back £171 million, ahead of schedule. Possible catalysts include full implementation of the Homes for London package, a faster Building Safety Regulator and stamp duty reform: Berkeley wants a 1% cap for first-time buyers and downsizers and the 5% investor Surcharge scrapped.

Valuation talking points

Much of the debate centres on book value. Buybacks in May to August 2026 averaged £34.18 a share, about 13% below the 3,917p net asset value per share reported at 30 April. Supporters argue that buying stock below book, backed by net cash, creates value for remaining holders. Sceptics reply that Book Value rests on land values and margins that may not hold if London stays weak.

The £6.4 billion embedded gross margin supports the long-term case but will take years to realise, and lower production makes earnings-based measures less flattering.

The bull case

  • Brownfield expertise and a large consented land bank create barriers that few rivals can match.
  • Net cash of £363 million at April 2026, with £1.563 billion of total liquidity, gives protection in a downturn.
  • Buybacks below net asset value per share could steadily increase value per share.
  • Reduced land spending from the end of FY27 should release cash for further returns or build-to-rent investment.
  • Any policy help, such as stamp duty cuts or quicker approvals, could revive off-plan Demand quickly.

The bear case

  • The £1.4 billion four-year target implies clearly lower annual profits than in recent years.
  • Forward sales and reservations have fallen sharply, and management expected net cash to fall to about £250 million by the half year.
  • Berkeley says London apartment schemes now take around eight years to deliver, compared with five a decade ago, which ties up Capital and adds risk.
  • Management expects build cost Inflation to pick up from late 2026 into 2027.
  • Building safety work remains outstanding on 39 buildings under its 2023 self-remediation contract.

The bottom line

Berkeley's brownfield model is intact, and its land bank would be hard for competitors to replicate. What has changed is the company's view of the London market, which it now regards as too heavily taxed and regulated to justify buying more land.

For now, the Investment case rests less on growth and more on discipline: turning existing sites into cash, keeping the balance sheet strong and returning capital through buybacks. Interim results on 9 December 2026 should show whether profits are coming through as guided and whether policy makers are responding to the company's calls for change.